India and the Syrian Imbroglio: Part 2

The conclusion in the GCC is that a civil war will strengthen the Asaad regime and allow his regime to last longer. This is why from the beginning the KSA has been telling the US that they don't want the MB in power in Syria (The US is busy cutting deals with MB in Egypt and Syria if some sources are to be believed but we'll leave that for another day) and that the KSA want a secular govt in power (another reason for this is that arabia has been at war with Mesapotamia and Persia since mankind).

So what’s the next step?
  

The next step is for the intelligence services of the GCC, Turkey and Jordan to contact the key movers and shakers within the Syrian military. Making them split and join with the protestors will actually strengthen the Asaad position and allow him to retain control for longer. Then Syria will descend into another Iraq. So the move is to essentially establish contact with the Syrian Colnols/ National Security Council etc and negotiate with them. Get their opinions together and eventually cripple the ability of the military to function. Then essentially ask for their support for the Syrian people's aspirations. This could be similar to that of Egypt or could even be via a military coup de etat.

This should occur when soldiers are sick off killing unarmed protestors to the point of disgust and start rebelling against illegitimate instructions from superiors.

The defection of Col. Maher Al Asaad showed that even minorities are against the Asaad regime. The protestors have decided not to take up arms and this is actually to prevent a civil war from taking place.

Asaad's response.

 

Syrian army operations in Northern Syria

Asaad's response has been quite smart. He is not afraid to kill many people. His forces in key positions are mainly from the Syrian minorities and from families that have been allied with the regime. This has brought an attitude where the soldiers are killing for the protection of their communities. The continued use of the terms 'fighting armed groups' is to project a legitimacy and maintain the morale of the military and avert pressure.

However, our sources suggest that the Asaad regime has decided to sideline the military from anti protestor operations. The regime has chosen to use the Hezbollah, Iranian police/troops and other Alawite militia's to conduct the anti protestor policing/killings. This is to prevent the military from splitting.

The Syrian intelligence has conducted several operations in neighbouring countries. Intelligence sources confirm that several key opposition figures (Over a dozen) have been kidnapped in Turkey and Lebanon by the Syrian intelligence. The well known case to date is that of Colonel Hussein Harmoush who has retracted all his statements that he made when he had defected.

Tehran's role

Tehran's role is to provide military support and also from a strategic perspective provide the Syrian regime with the experience (dealing with protestors, their communication, disrupting protesters via the internet) that was learned during the 2009 mass protests in Iran in the wake of Ahmadinejad's election victory. 

The Iranian National Security council have written a document on how they can provide support to the Syrian regime. These mainly involve economic projects such as the $10billion oil & gas pipeline from Iran to Syria of which lots of money had already been transferred to the Syrian government.

Iran will have to switch focus back to its internal problems eventually with planned demonstrations against Corruption and also how to organize future parliamentary elections. It is also important to note the last IRGC exercise was actually on how to deal with demonstrations across Iranian cities.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is that we expect to see this conflict being drawn out for a longer period than previously expected although the Turkish intelligence is telling its friends that Asaad's fall will come quickly. Is this because they have already began negotiating with key players?

As India is a relatively fringe player in this crisis, we should remain neutral and suggest that the Asaad regime must implement reforms or risk exhausting the patience of the international community. At the same time, we should begin establishing contacts with key elements of the regime to ensure our interests in the country are protected in a post Asaad Syria.